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ABSTRACT. The main goal of the paper is to provide 
the first ex-post analysis of the EU ETS in year 2013 in 
the Czech Republic, based on the analysis of the key EU 
ETS sector – combustion processes. Regarding the 
methodology, the empirical research was used as a one 
part, as a second part the Mamdani fuzzy rule-based 
system. Since the EUA market price was low in year 
2013, the Czech companies within the combustion 
processes group had weak motivation to trade with the 
EUAs. However, the revenues obtained from the EUA 
auctions in year 2013 were higher than revenues obtained 
from the environmental taxes. Moreover, auctioned 
EUAs had the similar characteristics as the environmental 
taxes. We can say that the EUA behaved as an additional 
carbon tax – in case that the company exceeded the level 
of emission limit represented by free emission 
allowances. 
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Introduction 
 
Generally, emission allowances trading, also called as “cap and trade program”, 
originally started up in the USA and currently it is frequently used throughout the world. 
National or sub-national emission trading systems are already operating in Australia, the 
European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States, and are planned in 
Canada, China and South Korea (European Commission, 2013). Besides trading with 
emissions (mainly CO2, NOx, SO2), there are also tradable fish quota or trading in waste 
sector, water protection sector and land protection sector.  
The European Union established a scheme for CO2 and other greenhouse gases’ 
emission allowances trading, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The initial EU 
ETS was based on Directive 2003/87/EC, which established a fundamentally decentralized 
system for the pilot phase of emissions trading (2005 to 2007) and the Kyoto Protocol 
commitment phase (2008 to 2012). The key instruments were the National Allocation Plans 
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(NAPs) (Wettestad et al., 2012). In year 2013, based on new Directive 2009/29/EC, the EU 
ETS came into Phase III (2013 to 2020), the post-Kyoto commitment period. 
The EU ETS is substantially larger and by far more complex than the pioneering US 
Sulphur Allowance System (Conrad et al., 2012). The EU ETS covers more than 11,000 
power stations and manufacturing plants in the 28 EU member states as well as Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. Aviation operators flying within and between most of these 
countries are also covered. In total, around 45% of total EU emissions are limited by the EU 
ETS (European Commission, 2013). The EU ETS covers both European Emissions 
Allowances – EUAs (since 2005) and European Aviation Allowances – EUAAs (since 2012). 
The market price of the allowances is determined by supply and demand at the exchange. 
Both in the first and in the second trading period, the EU emission allowances were traded 
mostly on the BlueNext trading exchange. In the third trading period, there is one significant 
big exchange, where the auctions can be organized – European Energy Exchange EEX (EEX, 
2015).  
The regulatory framework of the EU ETS was largely unchanged for the first two 
trading periods of its operation (2005 – 2012); however the beginning of the third trading 
period in 2013 brings changes in common rules, published as Directive 2009/29/EC, which 
should strengthen the system. Since the EU emission allowances were previously 
grandfathered – for free (Wettestad et al., 2012), from year 2013 the significant yield of the 
emission allowances is auctioned. Grandfathering was widely criticized, mostly because it 
introduced significant distortions to the EU ETS (Falbo et al., 2013). Auctioning is the most 
transparent method of allocating allowances and puts into practice the polluter pays principle 
(Vicha, 2011; European Commission, 2013). Sectorial differentiation was also introduced, 
with (initially) far more auctioning of allowances for energy producers than energy-intensive 
industries. In addition, free allocations were further harmonized, to be based on common 
state-of-the-art technology benchmarks (Wettestad et al., 2012, p. 73). Policy makers give 
firms an incentive to move towards production that is less fossil-fuel intensive (Aatola et al., 
2013). 
In last years, CO2 emissions became also a significant member of the European 
commodity trading market. However, there is a fundamental difference between trading in 
CO2 and more traditional commodities. Sellers are expected to produce fewer emissions than 
they are allowed to, so they may sell the unused allowances to someone who emits more than 
the allocated amount. Therefore, the emissions become either an asset or a liability for the 
obligation to deliver allowances to cover those emissions (Benz and Trück, 2009). Regarding 
the EU emission allowances spot price, it fluctuated significantly both in the first and the 
second trading period; in the period 2005 – 2007, the EUA spot price fluctuated between 25 
EUR/t CO2 at the beginning of the period and the nearly zero level in the end of the period. In 
the second trading period, the EUA spot price fluctuated in the range 6 – 25 EUR/t CO2. 
Focusing on year 2013, the average EUA auction price was 4,4 EUR/t CO2. Regarding the 
whole trading period 2005 – 2013, you can see that the EUA price development shows high 
volatility. 
Focusing on the Czech Republic, CO2 emission trading is a part of the mix of 
economic instruments within environmental and climate policy, precisely we can find it 
besides environmental taxes, charges and subsidies (Pavel and Vitek, 2012; Zimmermannova 
and Mensik, 2013).  
In the terms of the trend in CO2 emissions per KWH, the Czech Republic ranks on 56th 
out of 178 countries (same as in 2002) and compared to European region peer set is that trend 
worse by 15%. In the terms of the trend in carbon intensity the Czech Republic ranks on 25th 
(same as in 2002) and compared to European region peer set is that trend better by 15%. 
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Industry has been still considered for the largest polluter in the Czech Republic (Solilová and 
Nerudová, 2015). 
The following Figure 1 shows the development of total CO2 emissions in the Czech 
Republic regulated by the EU ETS and the share of particular sectors of national economy 
regulated by the EU ETS on total CO2 emissions production in the Czech Republic regulated 
by the EU ETS.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. CO2 emissions history in the Czech Republic within the EU ETS.  
Source: CHMI, 2015; own work. 
 
It is obvious, that the most significant share of CO2 emissions on total CO2 emissions 
production in the Czech Republic within the EU ETS has been produced by the combustion 
processes sector. This sector emitted almost 88% of total CO2 emissions in year 2013. You 
can see that the curve of total CO2 emissions within the EU ETS has similar development as 
the combustion processes emissions curve it self; moreover the CO2 emissions produced by 
the other sectors are negligible in comparison with CO2 emissions produced by combustion 
processes sector.  
Based on the above described development of CO2 emissions in the Czech Republic, 
we focused our research on an empirical analysis of the behaviour of the most significant CO2 
emissions producer in the Czech Republic – the combustion processes sector. 
 
1. Literature Overview 
 
Since emission allowance trading has primarily started in the US, the majority of 
publications dealing with tradable emission allowances assess the market for SO2 emissions 
under the Acid Rain Program (Benz and Trück, 2009). Regarding the EU ETS, scientists have 
focused mostly on modelling and forecasting the prices of CO2 emission allowances (Benz 
and Trück, 2009; Li et al., 2011; Conrad et al., 2012; Garcia-Martos et al., 2013; Lecuyer and 
Quirion, 2013), the incidence of the carbon price (Grainger and Kolstad, 2010; Cermak et al., 
2015), the EUA price drivers (Aatola et al., 2013; Lutz et al., 2013), the marginal cost of both 
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energy intensive companies and power sector (Lund, 2007; Chernyavska and Gulli, 2008), the 
influence of emission allowance trading on electricity producers (Lund, 2007; Chernyavska 
and Gulli, 2008; Falbo et al., 2013) or its innovation impact (Rogge et al., 2011; Rentizelas et 
al., 2012). 
The authors of scientific papers have used various methods for their research 
connected with the EU ETS. We can find scientific studies, which describe particular models 
of EU ETS, created with different methods and different targets. For example, Li et al. (2011) 
used fuzzy modelling (an interval-fuzzy two stage stochastic programming model) for 
planning CO2 emission trading in industry systems under uncertainty, Conrad et al. (2012) 
used GARCH models for modelling the adjustment process of EUA´s prices to scheduled 
macroeconomic and regulatory announcements. Aatola et al. (2013) created an equilibrium 
model of the emission trading market for the purposes of the EU ETS price determination, 
Falbo et al. (2013) created model based on the profit function for tracking of impacts of 
EUAs on the optimal policy of a competitive electricity producer. Garcia – Martos et al. 
(2013) used both ARIMA and VARIMA models for building a multivariate model for the 
afore mentioned prices and comparing its results with those of univariate ones, Lecuyer and 
Quirion (2013) created analytical and numerical model of the EU energy and carbon market 
for implications of the possibility of a nil carbon price on optimal policy instrument choice. 
Lutz et al. (2013) used Markov regime-switching GARCH model for examination of the non-
linear relationship between the EUA price and its fundamentals. Cermak et al. (2015) created 
broker simulation model which integrates different original soft computing and decision 
making methods. 
Focusing on empirical studies, based on official data, questionnaire surveys and 
interviews, we can find particular studies in the area of the innovation impacts of the EU ETS 
in Germany (Rogge et al., 2011), the impacts on the investments in Sweden (Lofgren et al., 
2014) or empirical ex post analyses of the EU ETS in the EU as a whole (Feng et al., 2012; 
Lovell et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2014). 
Considering the characteristics of particular instruments of CO2 pricing, precisely 
emission allowances trading and environmental taxation, their impacts, efficiency and 
optimization, the particular economists have different opinions. The comparison and 
assessment of these economic instruments is not trivial, since it can be important additional 
source of information for policy makers in particular countries.  
Dealing with the most interesting studies in this area, for example Nordhaus (2005, 
2011) focused his research mainly on carbon taxation and emission allowances efficiency 
comparison, advantages and disadvantages of both economic instruments, and he strongly 
prefers taxation before emissions trading. Regarding his opinion, the fluctuations of the EUA 
price and its volatility within the EU ETS in one trading period is not good for investments 
planning. As a recommendation for the policy makers, he has proposed pure carbon taxation 
in the context of current fiscal policy as the most suitable instrument for greenhouse gas 
emissions cutting. He also suggests the consequent international harmonization of carbon 
taxes throughout the world as one of the policy instruments of international climate policy.  
Speck (1999) also recommends carbon taxation, since there are many sources of 
emissions, which cannot be involved in emission allowances trading system and moreover 
which are considerably heterogeneous. He also emphasizes potential benefits of carbon taxes 
in the field of so called „double dividend“, which can be considered as a typical argument of 
environmental taxation supporters (Bork, 2006, Ekins, 2007). 
On the other hand, there are economists, which support emission allowances trading. 
For example Mansur (2013) indicates that relative to a tax, tradable permits may improve 
welfare in a market with imperfect competition. Moreover, based on his model of strategic 
and competitive behavior of wholesalers in a Mid-Atlantic electricity market, in case of 
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regulators are opted to use a tax instead of permits, the deadweight loss from imperfect 
competition is greater. 
However, Goulder (2013) for the purposes of research of climate change policy’s 
interactions with the tax system included both a carbon tax and cap-and-trade system under 
the general label of “green tax”, since the two environmental policies have the same features. 
Regarding the efficiency of “green taxes” and marginal costs of pollution abatement, we can 
have two different groups of “green taxes” – 1) carbon tax (revenues recycled lump-sum) and 
cap-and-trade, freely allocated allowances; 2) carbon tax (revenues recycled via marginal rate 
cuts) and cap-and-trade, auctioned allowances (revenues recycled via marginal rate cuts).  
 
2. The main objectives of the paper 
 
Currently, there is a lack of studies dealing with the impacts of the EU ETS in the 
Czech Republic, moreover there is no ex post analysis of the 3rd trading period of the EU ETS 
with its new rules. Regarding these consequences, the main target of this paper is to provide 
the first ex post analysis of the EU ETS in the Czech Republic for year 2013, based on an 
empirical research at one side and Mamdani fuzzy rule-based system on the other side. For 
the purposes of this paper, 3 hypotheses are defined: 
H1) Since the EUA market price was low in year 2013, the Czech companies within 
the combustion processes group had no motivation to trade with the EUAs on the exchange. 
H2) The revenues obtained from emission allowance auctioning in year 2013 are 
negligible in comparison with the revenues obtained from the environmental taxes and fees in 
year 2013. 
H3) Auctioned emission allowance had the similar characteristics as the environmental 
taxes and fees in the Czech Republic in year 2013. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
 
For the purposes of this paper, we used different sources of data. At first, focusing on 
CO2 emission allowances price and its development, data from EEX exchange (EEX, 2015), 
the leading energy exchange in Europe, was used, particularly the EU emission allowances 
(EUAs) auction prices in particular auctioning days.  
We used also data from official statistics of the Czech Republic – Czech Statistical 
Office (CZSO), Czech Hydrometeorological Institute (CHMI), Ministry of the Environment 
of the Czech Republic (MoE) and Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic (MoF). 
Regarding environmental taxes and fees in the Czech Republic, the data from current 
legislation was used, including particular rates of taxes and fees.  
Dealing with the behavior of the companies within the combustion processes in the 
Czech Republic and their decision-making (see Pawliczek and Piczszur, 2013); we used 
2 sources of data and information. The first data set was based on the consultations and 
interview with the expert from Association for the District Heating of the Czech Republic – 
Association of Entrepreneurs in the Field of Heat Supply (ADH CR), who is responsible for 
the emission allowances trading. The second step of data mining and obtaining more precise 
data set was based on the questionnaire survey, which was focused on the key electricity and 
heat producers, members of working group on the EU ETS and environmental taxation within 
ADH CR.  
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3.3. The fuzzy rule-based system 
 
For the purposes of the electricity and heat producer’s behavior and decision making 
analysis, fuzzy rule-based system (more details in Pokorný, 2015) was used, precisely 
Mamdani type of rules (Čermák and Pokorný, 2001). The Mamdani fuzzy rule-based system 
is defined as 
 
IF (x1 is A1,1) AND . . . (x is An,1) THEN (y1 is C1)  
IF (x1 is A1,1) AND . . . (x is An,1) THEN (y2 is C2)   (1) 
... 
IF (x1 is A1,r) AND . . . (x is An,r) THEN (yr is Cr). 
 
We created set of Mamdani rules for the producers within the sector of combustion 
processes. General rules are based on purchases or sales of the EUAs on the market. Based on 
Mamdani fuzzy rule-based system, we created 162 rules for the electricity and heat producer 
in the Czech Republic. We used the economic indicators, which can influence the behavior of 
the typical producers. The following economic indicators were selected on the basis of the 
questionnaire survey results – respondents indicated that these indicators influence their 
decision-making: 
1. The EUA price trend development. 
2. The producer situation – the current amount of available EUAs and the current CO2 
emissions. 
3. The environmental policy development in the CR and the EU. 
4. GDP development. 
There can be 3 results of behavior of the producer, precisely the following: 
1. no action – the producer has no requirements on the market; 
2. standard sale or standard purchase – the producer will calculate his own profit, he can 
trade on the market; 
3. big sale or big purchase – the situation is really outstanding for the trading on the 
market – the producer will surely buy or sell the EUAs on the market. 
The example of one Mamdani rule is the following: “IF the EUA price trend 
development is decrease AND the producer has EUAs for all of his CO2 emissions AND 
environmental policy has been tightened AND GDP development is increase THEN behavior 
on the market is standard purchase”. 
Based on defined 162 rules, the behavior of companies in the Czech Republic was 
generalized. We also identified and specified the “price” rules for the electricity and heat 
producers in the Czech Republic, also based on results of the questionnaire survey. 
 
4. Results  
 
4.1. The behaviour of companies 
 
Based on the questionnaire survey results, we can say, that all respondents within the 
group “big sources” in the Czech Republic had to buy additional emission allowances in year 
2013. Regarding small and medium sources, the answers were not the same, it depended 
mainly on actual covering of the emissions by the EUAs and on both policy and strategy of 
the management of particular companies. 
Regarding the EUA price as a motivation for the trading on the exchange, 
2 respondents within the group “big sources” evaluated the EUA price as motivating, 
2 respondents within the group “big sources” and 1 respondent within the group “small and 
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survey respondents, since the others were not allowed to answer to these kinds of questions by 
their top management. 
Based on these findings, we can identified the “price” rules for the combustion 
processes in the Czech Republic, which can be expressed through Mamdani fuzzy rule-based 
system.  
 
4.2. Set of Mamdani rules for the producer in the sector of combustion processes 
 
At first, we should start with general rules of behavior of the producer in the sector of 
combustion processes in the Czech Republic within the EU ETS system. General rules will be 
based on purchases or sales of the EUAs on the market.  
Regarding 162 basic rules for the electricity and heat producer behaviour in total, the 
general overview of possibilities of the producer behaviour in the Czech Republic was 
created. The key categories are based on different situations connected with the available 
amount of the EUAs and CO2 emissions in particular year. The following Table 1 summarizes 
the possibilities of behavior of the producer in particular situations. 
 
Table 1. Overview of possibilities of the electricity and heat producer’s behavior in CR  
 
The producer has no EUAs to cover his CO2 emissions 
Purchase Sale 
Mainly big and standard purchase. No action 
The producer has EUAs to cover his CO2 emissions only partially  
Purchase Sale 
Mainly standard purchase 
Big purchase can be in the following situations 
(one or more of them simultaneously): 
- EUA price trend development is decrease 
- Environmental policy has been tightened 
- GDP development is increase 
No action 
The producer has EUAs to cover all of his CO2 emissions 
Purchase Sale 
Mainly no action 
Standard purchase can be in the following 
situations (one or more of them simultaneously): 
- EUA price trend development is stagnation or 
decrease; 
- Environmental policy has been tightened or 
unchanged; 
- GDP development is stagnation or increase. 
Mainly no action 
Standard sale can be in the following situations 
(one or more of them simultaneously): 
- EUA price trend development is stagnation 
or increase; 
- Environmental policy is more polluter-
friendly or unchanged; 
- GDP development is stagnation or decrease; 
- Management of company supports trading 
and speculations. 
 
Source: own work, based on consultations and the questionnaire survey. 
 
Generally, the possibility of “sale” can be used only when the producer has enough 
EUAs to cover all of his emissions. Based on the questionnaire survey results, we can say, 
that in year 2013, there was only one producer in the sector of combustion processes in the 
Czech Republic, who was regular seller on the exchange. Almost all of the electricity and heat 
producers were only the EUAs buyers.  
Based on the questionnaire survey results, we can also identify the “price” rules for the 
combustion processes in the Czech Republic, which can be expressed through Mamdani fuzzy 
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rule-based system. The producers considered the price 0-5,99 EUR per EUA as the most 
suitable for their purchases. On the other hand, they would sale the EUAs only when the 
market price would be 11 EUR and more per EUA, moreover only when the policies and 
strategies of their companies would allow them to do it. So, the general “price” rules can be 
defined as the following Mamdani rules: 
IF the EUA price is SMALL AND environmental taxes are almost constant AND the 
strategy of the company is rather trading friendly THEN the producer buys the EUAs only 
to cover his CO2 emissions;  
IF the EUA price is MIDDLE AND environmental taxes are almost constant AND the 
strategy of the company is rather trading friendly THEN the producer buys the EUAs to 
cover his CO2 emissions, but starts to think about trading with the EUAs on the exchange; 
IF the EUA price is HIGH AND environmental taxes are almost constant AND the 
strategy of the company is rather trading friendly THEN the producer buys the EUAs to 
cover his CO2 emissions, but starts to make his own predictions and calculations of the 
EUAs;  
IF the EUA price is HIGHER AND environmental taxes are almost constant AND the 
strategy of the company is rather trading friendly THEN the producer buys the EUAs to 
cover his CO2 emissions, but starts to trade with the EUAs on the exchange;  
IF the EUA price is THE HIGHEST AND environmental taxes are almost constant 
AND the strategy of the company is rather trading friendly THEN the producer buys the 
EUAs to cover his CO2 emissions and trades with the EUAs on the exchange. 
The results of the questionnaire survey showed us the approximate values of SMALL, 
MIDDLE, HIGH, HIGHER and THE HIGHEST and it served us as an input to the Table 3. 
Regarding an explanation of these general price rules, SMALL represents approximately 0 – 6 
EUR/t CO2, MIDDLE represents approximately 6 – 8 EUR/t CO2, HIGH represents 
approximately 7 – 9 EUR/t CO2, HIGHER represents approximately 8 – 10 EUR/t CO2 and 
THE HIGHEST represents more than 10 EUR/t CO2. The following Figure 4 shows us the 
behavior of Czech producer in the sector of combustion processes in year 2013 in graphical 
expression. Since the Figure 4 is based on fuzzy rules, the frontiers between particular EUA 
prices are not sharp, but blurred. 
 
1. 0         1         2         3         4         5         6         7          8         9        10
SMALL                                            MIDDLE   HIGH   HIGHER    HIGHESTμ
1
Price [EUR]  
 
Figure 4. Shapes of Membership Functions for Given Input Variable Price 
Source: own work. 
 
Focusing on the EUA market price development, the following Figure 5 shows us the 
development of the EUA auction price in year 2013. The red line represents the level 6 
EUR/EUA, when the producers start to think about more active trading with the EUAs on the 
exchange (not only purchases for the purposes of covering all CO2 emissions). The red line 6 
EUR/EUA represents also the middle level in the previous Figure 4. 
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Figure 5. The EUA Auction Price in Y2013 
Source: EEX, 2015; own work. 
 
We can see, that the EUA auction price in year 2013 fluctuated in the interval 6,18 
EUR/EUA (7.1.2013) and 2,75 EUR/EUA (18.4.2013), where only 2 auction days represent 
the auction price higher than 6 EUR/EUA. Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4, it is obvious, 
that the electricity and heat producers in the Czech Republic evaluated the EUA price as small 
in year 2013 and therefore participated on the market only in the role of the buyers – usually 
bought the EUAs only to cover all of their CO2 emissions. 
 
4.3. Comparison of characteristics of the EUAs and environmental taxes  
 
For the purposes of the comparison of the EU ETS and environmental taxation in year 
2013 in the Czech Republic, we selected the following characteristics: emission’s price in 
Y2013, behaviour of the companies on the market, budgetary determination of revenues, 
regulated emissions and the primary price impact. 
We can compare the average EUA auction price in year 2013 with air protection fees’ 
rates (imposed on SO2, NOx, VOC and PM emissions) and CO2 tax proposal (revision of 
2003/96/EC Directive). The following Figure 6 shows us the comparison of all tax rates, 
charges and emissions’ prices in year 2013. However, the energy taxes are missing, since 
their tax rates are not directly imposed on pollution. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of the particular pollutant’s prices in CR in Y2013 
Source: Zimmermannova and Cermak, 2015. 
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You can see, that the average EUA auction price in year 2013 (4,4 EUR per ton of 
CO2) is much more lower than all of the fees imposed on other pollutants in air protection 
area in the Czech Republic, relative to the tonne of particular pollutant; moreover it is lower 
than CO2 tax proposed in revision of Directive 2003/96/EC (20 EUR per ton of CO2). 
However, we should focus also on revenues obtained from the EUA auctions, air protection 
fees and general energy taxation, based on current Directive 2003/96/EC. The following 
Figure 7 shows the comparison of all revenues from environmental taxes and charges in the 
Czech Republic in year 2013. Focusing on total revenues obtained from the EUA auctions, air 
protection fees and general environmental taxation, based on current 2003/96/EC directive, 
we obtained rather interesting results. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Environmental taxes and EUA auction’s revenues in CR in Y2013 
Source: Zimmermannova and Cermak, 2015. 
 
It is obvious, that contrary to the lowest “emission price”, the revenues from the EUA 
auctions in year 2013 were higher than revenues obtained from all of the air protection fees; 
furthermore it exceeded revenues obtained from particular energy taxes – natural gas tax, 
solid fuel tax and electricity tax. We can say that the auctioned EUAs were important source 
of public budgets revenues in the Czech Republic in year 2013.  
Focusing on budgetary determination of these revenues, the following Table 2 shows 
us the distribution of 50% of total auctions revenues. The rest of the auction revenues come to 
the general state budget. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of 50% of Total Auctions Revenues  
 
Period State Environmental Fund Ministry of Industry and Trade 
2013 100% 0%
2014 - 2015 65% 35%
2016 - 2020 60% 40%
 
Source: Current legislation; own work. 
 
You can see, that in year 2013, all additional revenues obtained from the auctions (the 
EUA auctions on behalf of the Czech Republic) were partially the income partially of the 
State Environmental Fund and partially of the general state budget. It is the same as in case of 
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environmental taxes and fees in the Czech Republic. In year 2014, there is another one 
receiver of the total auction revenues – Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic. 
The following Table 3 summarizes particular characteristics of the EUAs, 
environmental taxes and emission fees in year 2013 in the Czech Republic and focuses on 
their comparison. 
 
Table 3. The comparison of characteristics in year 2013  
 
 EUA – auctions Energy taxes Emission fees 
Emission price, tax rate Floating – based on market development 
Fixed - based on 
2003/96/EC 
Fixed - based on 
national legislation 
Trading – auctions, 
secondary market 
EUA price < 6 EUR almost 
only purchase 
EUA price > 10 EUR 
possibility of sale 
No No 
The key role of 
companies The EUA price payer Tax payer Fee payer 
Budgetary 
determination of 
revenues 
General state budget, State 
Environmental Fund 
General state 
budget  
State Environmental 
Fund 
Emissions CO2 and ekv. 
Mixture of 
emissions SO2, NOx, VOC, PM 
Payer Companies Companies, households Companies 
Primary incidence Energy product’s prices Energy product’s prices 
Energy product’s 
prices 
 
Source: Current legislation; own work. 
 
Since the rules of the EU ETS changed and the total amount of the EUAs for 
companies is no more entirely for free, the companies are more interested in the EU ETS and 
pay attention on their own predictions and calculations of the EUAs prices.  
Regarding trading on the exchange, we can say, that the low EUAs price in year 2013 
represented weak motivation for the electricity and heat producers in the Czech Republic to 
trade on the exchange. Generally, the companies were almost entirely buyers on the exchange, 
they were willing to sale the EUAs only if its price was higher than 10 EUR. Focusing on the 
other characteristics, it is obvious, that the EUAs and environmental taxes in the Czech 
Republic had similar characteristics in year 2013, precisely in the area of the role of 
companies (producers), budgetary determination of revenues and primary price impact. 
However, focusing on addressing emissions, there was a difference, of course, since 
the Czech Republic had no direct carbon taxes in year 2013. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Based on the consultations and interview with the EU ETS expert from Association 
for the District Heating of the Czech Republic – Association of Entrepreneurs in the Field of 
Heat Supply and the results of the questionnaire survey, we can say that the emission 
allowances represent in the Czech Republic an important environmental policy instrument, 
which can influence strategies and investments of all companies involved in the EU ETS.  
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Since the EU ETS changed, the companies are more interested in it and pay attention 
on their own predictions and calculations of the EUAs prices. They also calculate with the 
EUAs in their medium-term plans and investments decisions.  
Focusing on our three hypotheses, we can conclude the following: 
H1) Since the EUA market price was low in year 2013, the Czech companies within the 
combustion processes group had no motivation to trade with the EUAs on the exchange. 
Based on our ex-post analysis, we can partially confirm this hypothesis. Since the 
EUA auction price was higher than 6 EUR/EUA only in 2 auction days in 2013 (see 
Figure 4), the most of the Czech companies evaluated the EUA price as small and therefore 
was on the market only in the role of the buyer – usually bought the EUAs only to cover all of 
their CO2 emissions. Based on the questionnaire survey, we can say that in year 2013 in the 
Czech Republic, there was only one producer within the combustion processes, which 
regularly traded on the exchange and sold the EUAs. Almost all of the electricity and heat 
producers were only the EUAs buyers.  
H2) The revenues obtained from emission allowance auctioning in year 2013 are negligible 
in comparison with the revenues obtained from the environmental taxes and fees in year 
2013. 
Based on our ex-post analysis, we can reject this hypothesis. Although the average 
CO2 emission “price” in year 2013 (4,4 EUR per ton of CO2) was lower than all of the fees 
imposed on other pollutants in air and climate protection area, the revenues from the EUA 
auctions in year 2013 were higher than all of the revenues obtained from all of the air 
protection fees and revenues obtained from general energy taxes – natural gas tax, solid fuel 
tax and electricity tax. We can say, that the auctioned EUAs are currently important source of 
public budgets revenues. Moreover, it is evident, that this kind of revenues will be more 
important depending on increasing share of total EUAs determined for auctions. It supports 
also Ekins and Speck conclusion (2011), that the decision to auction from 2013 the majority 
(and by 2027 100%) of the EU ETS emission allowances means that governments will have a 
new source of environment-related revenues. 
H3) Auctioned emission allowance had the similar characteristics as the environmental taxes 
and fees in the Czech Republic in year 2013. 
Based on our ex-post analysis, we can partially confirm this hypothesis. It is obvious, 
that if the EUA market price was lower than 6 EUR per ton than it behaved almost entirely as 
a carbon tax or fee. The companies only “paid for CO2 emissions”, they did not use the EUA 
as a “commodity” for trading. Therefore the EUA behaved as an additional carbon tax or fee – 
in case that the company exceeded the level of emission limit represented by free emission 
allowances. Moreover, the budgetary determination of revenues obtained from auctions was 
in year 2013 the same as in case of environmental taxes and fees in the Czech Republic – 
General state budget and State Environmental Fund. 
Besides the subject of particular economic instruments – particular emissions of CO2, 
NOx, SO2, VOC and PM, and consequently mix of emissions under the energy taxation, the 
significant difference between emission trading and environmental taxation in the Czech 
Republic in year 2013 can be visible in the “floating tax rate”.   
There should be also highlighted Goulder’s idea: “I will include both a carbon tax and 
cap-and-trade system under the general label of “green tax”, since the two environmental 
policies have the same features” (Goulder, 2013). Based on the above described ex post 
analysis, we can say that in the Czech Republic in year 2013, these two economic instruments 
of the environmental policies had similar features. 
Based on Ekins and Speck research (2011), it has long been recognized that an 
auctioned environmental trading scheme has much in common with an environmental tax 
(Ekins and Speck, 2011, p. 354). Based on their research, it seems logical to include in the 
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definition of a possible environmental tax reform not only revenues generated from energy 
and environmental taxation, but also those resulting from the auctioning of the EU ETS 
emission allowances. 
It is important, that the companies within the combustion processes group understood 
the EU ETS much more as an additional environmental tax or fee, so the EUAs can represent 
additional costs for them. It is necessary to realize changing economic situation and business 
conditions of particular companies. Companies are constantly under pressure of reducing 
costs and finding of cost reserves. This is result of global expansion and developing 
Information Society, which asks still new requirements. That has important impact to 
structure of performed activities and so to structure and development of different cost groups. 
That causes problems and difficulties with theirs appropriate and exact allocation in relation 
to performance of production (more in Popesko, 2013 or Novák and Popesko, 2014). 
Moreover, small and medium sources of pollution represent also small and medium 
enterprises (SME), which are more sensitive to changes within external environment because 
of their size. In longer term period, discussion about SMEs problems is focused on issue of 
levies, quality of legal system and support of SMEs by government. For optimal functioning 
of the economic system, optimism of its participants is very important (Belas et al., 2014). 
Therefore the right and long term setting of the EU ETS rules is very important.  
Naturally, the EU ETS is constantly developing and changing and the behaviour of 
particular companies in the Czech Republic can also change in the following years. The next 
development of the behaviour of particular stakeholders of the EU ETS in the Czech Republic 
will be the object of our future research, simultaneously with possible analyses and 
recommendations for particular policy makers. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The results of this ex post analysis of the EU ETS show us, that the behaviour of the 
Czech companies is slightly different from policy makers’ expectations. Focusing on the 
behaviour of particular companies within the EU ETS in year 2013 in more details, it is 
obvious, that the most of them evaluated the EUA price as small and therefore was on the 
market only in the role of the buyers – usually bought the EUAs only to cover all of their CO2 
emissions.  
What is also important, the EUA price in year 2013 did not motivate the companies 
within the combustion processes sector to realize additional investments or technological 
adjustments for the purposes of CO2 emissions cutting. 
Regarding the public finance consequences, the auctioned EUAs were important 
source of public budgets revenues in the Czech Republic in year 2013. Moreover, it is 
evident, that this kind of revenues will be important mainly in next years, depending on 
increasing share of total EUAs determined for auctions within the EU ETS. We can say that 
the characteristics of CO2 emission allowances and environmental taxation in the Czech 
Republic were more similar in year 2013 than in the previous trading periods. 
The results of this ex post analysis can serve as an additional source of information for 
policy makers both in the Czech Republic and the EU; it can be valuable mainly for the 
purposes of the current economic instruments of the environmental, energy and climate policy 
adjustments.  
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